The Expressive and the Communicative Functions of Law, especially with Regard to Moral Issues by Burg, W. (Wibren) van der
WIBREN VAN DER BURG
THE EXPRESSIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTIONS OF
LAW, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO MORAL ISSUES ?
(Accepted 23 February 2000)
ABSTRACT. In this article, I argue that law has two often neglected functions:
the expressive and the communicative functions. They are especially important
for legislation on moral issues, such as biomedical ethics and anti-discrimination
law. The communicative function of law is a complex one: law may create a
normative framework, a vocabulary to structure normative discussions, as well
as institutions and procedures that promote further discussion. The expressive
function of law is at stake when it expresses which fundamental standards, which
values are regarded as important. The recognition of these functions is not only
important for descriptive purposes; it is also fruitful for normative theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Netherlands, like in many other Western countries, there
is a growing number of issues on the legislative agenda with an
explicit moral dimension. Many of these have to do with biomed-
ical ethics. What should the law say with respect to euthanasia?
Should we allow experiments with human embryos and promote
the development of technologies that can transform early embryos
into tissue banks, e.g., for brain tissue to be implanted into patients
with Parkinson’s disease? Should we permit the genetic modifica-
tion of corn to make it resistant to pesticides? Should we allow
hunting, fishing with live bait, animal experiments or the genetic
modification of sheep in order to make them produce certain blood
factors?
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Moral controversies on the legislative agenda are, however, not
restricted to bioethical issues. The rise of modern information
technology raises various questions with respect to privacy and
freedom of speech. The development of a more pluralist, multicul-
tural society confronts us with many problems as well, e.g., whether
we should tolerate religious attitudes and practices that discrim-
inate against women. Another issue is the struggle for equal rights
for gays and lesbians; the most recent discussion in Dutch politics
focuses on the question whether we should open up civil marriage
to same-sex couples.
This list of examples can very easily be extended. Not every-
where in the Western world are these same issues on the legislative
agenda; in other countries there are usually other moral issues at
the centre of public debate, such as the death penalty or affirmative
action.
These issues seem to have more in common than merely the fact
that their moral dimension is more explicit than in other issues.
They arouse much public attention, often accompanied with strong
emotional feelings, and they are highly controversial. The contro-
versies usually cut across party lines and are regarded as ‘free’
questions, on which every member of parliament is free to vote
according to his or her own conscience. Moreover, it is often quite
difficult to make good and adequate laws which really cover all
relevant aspects of the issue and which are effectively supported
by a majority in parliament, in society at large, and in the profes-
sional fields or practices involved. Consequently, these legislative
processes often take substantially longer than those concerning
issues with a financial or economic character.
Many of these issues involve a curious, almost paradoxical situ-
ation. On the one hand, there is a strong feeling that ‘there should be
a law’ against certain practices; on the other hand, there are much
vaguer views on the precise content of the law. Embryo regulation
is an example. Almost everyone feels strongly that there should be a
law which regulates experiments with embryos and which prohibits
at least certain types of experiments, but there is no equally strong
consensus on the limits to and the criteria for what is to be allowed
and what is not. Apart from the more extreme religious views, most
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opinions on the latter do not rest on very principled positions, and
they often change substantially during the public debate.
This may seem to suggest that, after all, the law does not really
have any business here. If we cannot explain in a principled way why
we want a law and what it should contain, perhaps the conclusion
should be that we had better leave it to the citizens to decide for
themselves. However, this conclusion would be too hasty. It does not
fit in very well with our strong intuitive feeling that there should be a
law on many of these issues, and that a civilised society should have
some form of legal control of euthanasia, animal and embryo exper-
iments, and so on. So we must find another approach to the business
of the law in issues like these. This leads to the central question of
this paper: How should the law, and especially legislation, deal with
these issues?
I will suggest that we develop a more sophisticated view of the
various ways in which law can play a role in society. Many members
of the public – but also many legislators and lawyers – still seem
to have a quite simple view of law: legislation regulates human
behaviour by making legal rules, specific action guides, which
emanate from the authority of the legislature. Some naive version of
a command theory – even if explicitly denounced by sophisticated
legal theorists – often seems to be at the background: by officially
declaring rules of behaviour, the legislature tells citizens what to do
or not to do. In connection with this, there is a focus on the tradi-
tional protective and instrumental functions of law, which stress the
role of law as protecting individuals and as an instrument for social
policies, respectively.
This view is much too simple, even if it still largely suffices for
many areas of the law. However, especially in fields where moral
dimensions are more explicit, and where citizens’ voluntary co-
operation is necessary, it becomes inadequate. Therefore, we need
to understand other ways in which the law can function in society in
order to be able to deal with legislation on moral issues. This socio-
logical understanding may help us to formulate new approaches to
the way in which we should deal with those issues.
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II. LAW AS PROTECTION AND AS AN INSTRUMENT
The distinction between the protective and the instrumental func-
tions of the law is a standard one in legal theory (even though there
are different interpretations of both functions).1 On the one hand,
the law is a protective shield for individual citizens, both against
fellow-citizens and against the state; on the other hand, the law is
an instrument for social policies. The basic idea can be found in
many legal theories, for example, in Ronald Dworkin’s distinction
between principle and policy.2
The protective function can simply be formulated as follows:
the law protects individual citizens. The central concept is that of
rights – the law gives a citizen certain rights to protect himself and
his interests. We need not only think here of the most fundamental
constitutional rights, but also, at a more concrete level, of patients’
rights or rights to damages. Some authors, such as Jürgen Habermas
and Ronald Dworkin, focus strongly on the law as a system of
(subjective) rights, thus overemphasising the protective function and
neglecting other functions.3
The instrumental function is more strongly connected with public
goals and interests. The law can serve as an instrument for realising
certain policies. Examples of public goals and interests for which
law has frequently been used are decent housing for all, a fair and
efficient distribution of the limited resources in health care, a good
system of education and a clean environment. In the decades after
World War II, there has been a major increase in instrumental law in
such fields.
Both functions are connected with the idea that the law regu-
lates through strict rules. Rights must be protected by clear rules
which imply obligations of third parties towards the persons holding
1 W.J. Witteveen, P. van Seters and G. van Roermund (1991), ‘Wat maakt de
wet symbolisch?’ in: id. (eds.), Wat maakt de wet symbolisch? Zwolle: W.E.J.
Tjeenk Willink, pp. 1–13, esp. at pp. 4–5, and R. Foque´ and A.C. ’t Hart (1990),
Instrumentaliteit en rechtsbescherming. Grondslagen van een strafrechtelijke
waardendiscussie, Arnhem/Antwerpen: Gouda Quint/Kluwer.
2 R. Dworkin (1978), Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, p. 22.
3 R. Dworkin (1978); J. Habermas (1992), Faktizität und Geltung, Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp.
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the rights. Policy goals are served by formulating detailed rules
to which, for example, schools or health-care institutions should
conform. The basic presupposition is that the law states clear rules
which serve as direct action guides for its citizens and which are, if
necessary, enforced by the state’s coercive apparatus.
In recent years, this view of law has increasingly been criticised.
Political scientists have called attention to the ‘regulatory crisis’,
the diminishing effect of legal rules in regulating and controlling
society.4 Somehow, the law does not always succeed in really
influencing people’s behaviour, and if it does, it often has adverse
side-effects. Usually, this criticism has been directed against instru-
mental law, but it can also be levelled at legislation aiming to protect
the rights of individuals. In health law, for example, it has been
argued that the protection of patients’ rights has gone too far and
negatively influences health-care practice.
Legislation on moral issues is particularly vulnerable to this type
of criticism. As a result of individualisation processes throughout
the Western world, the moral authority of the law has diminished.
Autonomous citizens tend to base their moral views less on tradi-
tional views as brought forward by authorities such as churches or
legislators; they increasingly decide for themselves which morality
they wish to follow. Thus, they will more and more decide for
themselves whether or not to obey the law, especially in those areas
where the law deals with moral controversies. If abortion is illegal
but doctors and women do not agree with the prohibition, they will
usually find ways to circumvent the law. Moreover, many of the
morally controversial activities cannot be easily controlled, either
because they take place in private surroundings (sexuality, drugs
use),5 or because they are easily shielded from state intervention
by medical professional secrecy (abortion, euthanasia6 or medical
experiments) or by our global society, which makes evasion to other
4 Cf. various contributions to G. Teubner (ed.) (1986), Dilemmas of Law in the
Welfare State, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
5 Cf. J.H. Skolnick (1968), ‘Coercion to Virtue’, Southern California Law
Review 41, pp. 588–641.
6 For a good overview of the problems of effective control of medical prac-
tice with respect to euthanasia, see J. Griffiths, A. Bood and H. Weyers (1998),
Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press. Analogous analyses might be made with respect to other medical actions.
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countries with less strict regulation relatively easy (experimental
research, abortion, biotechnology).
I do not want to elaborate on these well-known problems about
the effectiveness of the law. I think there are another two substantive
reasons why we should look for other functions of legislation. The
focus on the protective and instrumental functions is simply not
very helpful in trying to understand what the law’s business is on
moral issues. These issues can be better dealt with by means of
other categories than those of rights and interests, and with other
legal standards than rules.
1. We can talk about rights of individuals that the law should protect
or the policies it should serve in a fairly neutral, non-committal
way. The individuals and policies are in a sense external, inde-
pendent of ourselves; their claims and interests can be discussed
in an ‘objective’ way. Legislation on moral issues usually does
not have such a non-committal character. It tells us something
about ourselves, about us as a society and about us as members
of that society. Our legislation on euthanasia expresses how we,
as a society, look at human life. Legislation can express who we
are, what our identity is and which values we hold dear. It may
symbolise our identity, both as a collective and as the members of
that collective.
This expressive dimension is also connected with legislation
which serves the protection of individuals, but it cannot be reduced
to this protection. The Dutch Constitution, for example, expresses
that we are a democratic society which respects human rights.7 The
constitutional rights are important primarily, of course, because they
guarantee the protection of individuals. Even so, the constitutional
7 Cf. P. Noll (1972), ‘Gründe für die soziale Unwirksamkeit von Gesetzen’, in:
M. Rehbinder and H. Schelski (eds.), Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechts-
theorie, Bd. 3: Zur Effektivität des Rechts, Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, pp. 259–269,
at p. 262, who rightly remarks that constitutional clauses often have this symbolic
function, as a “der Selbstdarstellung dienende Behauptung” but he regards it as
a “reinen Symbolcharakter ohne Wirkleichheitsbezug”. Below, I will argue that
a symbolic function need not imply that a legal clause is ineffective or has no
connection with reality. Cf. also W.J. Wittteveen (1991), ‘De jacht op de wet’, in:
W.J. Witteveen et al. (eds.) (1991), pp. 115–136, esp. 120–121.
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provisions also have a different dimension: they symbolise that the
Netherlands is a civilised society.
In human-rights legislation, this expressive dimension is, usually,
not the primary dimension (though in some human-rights treaties it
may be relatively more important). Even if this expressive function
is secondary or even tertiary, it should still not be ignored. In many
of the moral issues now on the legislative agenda, however, this
expressive dimension is relatively more important. For example,
many of the problems about lifestyle diversity (alternative sexual
behaviour, the use of drugs) are dealt with in the Netherlands on the
basis of our self-image as a tolerant society.8 Legislation on these
issues can reinforce this identity but also change it, for example,
when laws are introduced that are clearly more restrictive.
This means that we also need other concepts to analyse what
the law can do. It is not only a matter of interests or rights, but
also of values. It is not surprising that Ronald Dworkin, the most
enthusiastic supporter of rights in recent legal theory, did not appeal
to rights when he wrote a book on bioethical issues.9 He even made
it explicitly clear that a rights framework is insufficiently sensitive
to all moral dimensions of those problems. According to Dworkin,
abortion should not be reduced to a conflict between the right to free
choice of the pregnant woman and the right to life of the unborn
child. We should rather analyse which more fundamental values are
at stake. We, therefore, need values as the central category rather
than rights and interests.10 I think a value perspective may also help
in analysing issues concerning animals or concerning the environ-
ment. It seems quite an unproductive course to me to argue about
the rights of animals or even the rights of trees and ecosystems.
Analyses in terms of interests will only be of some use in dealing
with higher animals, and even then it is inadequate to express those
8 Cf. W. van der Burg (1998), ‘Beliefs, Persons and Practices: Beyond
Tolerance’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1, pp. 227–254.
9 R. Dworkin (1993), Life’s Dominion, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
10 R. Dworkin (1993). I have elaborated the idea of how a value theory can offer
fruitful perspectives for bioethical issues in W. van der Burg (1996), ‘Legislation
on Human Embryos: From Status Theories to Value Theories’, Archiv für Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie 82, pp. 73–87.
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moral intuitions which have so far found tentative expression in
terms such as ‘intrinsic value’.11
2. On many moral issues, we are far from reaching a consensus.
The debates are characterised by strong pluralism and by still devel-
oping ideas. It is probable that, in twenty years time, we will have
abandoned some of our now deeply held moral convictions. This is
not only likely because our society changes very rapidly, but also
because technology presents us continuously with new possibilities
we have never imagined, and thus with new moral issues and new
perspectives on older issues. We are still trying to find out what
exactly is at stake in many moral issues and how to deal with them.
We do not know what we should protect or what policies to serve,
let alone how we could achieve this.
This indeterminacy has various implications. As we are still in
a process of reflection, it is impossible to present conclusive argu-
ments about the rules to be laid down in the law. Nevertheless, we
often cannot avoid to legislate now, even if we might think it wise
to do so because this process of reflection will probably not come to
an end soon. We have to make provisional legislation, knowing that
we may think differently about it several years hence. Legislation
should therefore be regarded as one phase in that moral-reflection
process rather than as simply the codification of consensual moral
norms or goals. Moreover, if the legislature has not made up its
mind conclusively and will probably change its mind in the future on
some points, it cannot simply expect its citizens to abide uncritically
by its rules. Many citizens will not even obey such a law if they
are not convinced themselves that the norms it contains are morally
justified.
11 R. Heeger (1997), ‘Respect for Animal Integrity?’, in: A. Nordgren (ed.),
Science, Ethics, Sustainability: The Responsibility of Science in Attaining Sustain-
able Development, Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis (Studies in Bioethics
and Research Ethics 2), pp. 243–252. Cf. also F.W.A. Brom (1997), Onherstel-
baar verbeterd. Biotechnologie bij dieren als een moreel probleem (diss. Utrecht
University), Assen: Van Gorcum, chs. 4 and 10.
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III. SYMBOLIC LEGISLATION
A fresh start should be made. What then is the business of the law
on moral issues, if it is not (or not only) to protect individuals or
to serve as an instrument for public policies? To find an answer
to this question, I think we should take a closer look at what is
often referred to as symbolic legislation. This may seem surprising.
Symbolic legislation has a bad reputation in the socio-legal litera-
ture, and not without reason. Yet the work of two authors, Vilhelm
Aubert and Joseph Gusfield, who are the most strongly connected
with this negative evaluation, also offers insights for a more positive
approach.
One classic text is that of Vilhelm Aubert, who analysed the
Norwegian statute on domestic help.12 He showed that this law had
two sides. The statute aimed to protect housemaids. However, it
had hardly any practical effect. It was thus merely a symbolic law,
enacted to appease the housemaids, but construed in such a way that
it could not be effectively enforced.
The other classic study is that of Joseph Gusfield on the Amer-
ican Temperance Movement.13 This movement may be regarded as
a symbolic crusade by the traditionally dominant cultural group in
the United States against relative newcomers, such as the Irish and
Italian Catholics and the urban industrial classes. It was a battle
about the character of the American society and about the status
of the rural white Anglo-Saxon Protestants and their style of living.
Prohibition (and especially the Eighteenth Amendment) expressed
the dominance of their value system. Anti-alcohol legislation was
not so much regarded as an instrument to eradicate completely the
drinking of alcohol but rather as a symbolic affirmation of the value
of the dominant subculture.
At first sight, both studies present a very negative view of
symbolic legislation. It is nice legislation which is simply ineffec-
tive, or it is the result of a symbolic crusade by a conservative
dominant group that feels threatened by social developments. Their
12 V. Aubert (1969), Sociology of Law: Selected Readings, Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
13 J.R. Gusfield (1976), Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American
Temperance Movement, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
40 WIBREN VAN DER BURG
basic insights, however, can be the starting point for a much broader
and positive view on the symbolic functions of legislation.
Aubert suggests that the law was ineffective for various reasons.
Domestic work has a special character as a combination of private
life and working life; the legal language used was incomprehensible
to the general public and the rules were too complex; there was no
effective control mechanism. This criticism partly seems to refer to
the old model of law as a system of rules backed by sanctions, but
there is also a different perspective on law to be found in Aubert’s
article. Two factors determining the effectiveness of the statute are
whether it effectively informs domestic workers and housewives
about the legal norms and whether it is the basis of further communi-
cation about those norms. Law can thus be regarded as a form of
communication and as a basis for further personal communication
within society.
We can learn from this case study that there are various ways in
which the law influences social reality. The type of influence I will
discuss focuses on the idea of communication. Law can commu-
nicate certain normative standards to society, and it can provide a
substantive and procedural framework in which communication can
take place on these standards and on the way in which responsible
citizens or organisations should interpret them and live up to them.
I will call this the communicative function of the law.
While Aubert’s study is mostly known because of its analysis of
the implementation process, Gusfield’s book focuses primarily on
the legislative process. Gusfield shows how the law may express
certain value systems and may symbolise the choice for one
perspective on the nation’s identity. This expressive function of the
law need not always be restricted to the controversial values of a
dominant group. Legislation may also express values that have a
broader basis in the self-image of a political community. In many
countries, the Constitution symbolises the democratic character of
a society and expresses the acceptance of democratic values; it is
thus a positive and non-contested symbol of the nation’s democratic
identity.
We may therefore develop a more positive view on symbolic
legislation. The symbolic function of law is, in my view, a combina-
tion of two distinct functions: the communicative and the expressive
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functions. The communicative function of law is a complex one: law
may create a normative framework, a vocabulary to structure norma-
tive discussion, as well as institutions and procedures that promote
further discussion. The expressive function of law is at stake when it
expresses which fundamental standards, which values are regarded
as important (values which are often regarded as connected with the
political community’s identity).14
I will discuss these two functions separately, but they are strongly
connected: because legislation expresses certain values and commu-
nicates them effectively, these values can be taken as a common
point of reference in interpretation and communication processes.
In my definition of the expressive and communicative functions, I
try to be neutral with regard to evaluation. If a law expresses and
effectively communicates common or shared values and identities,
it may have what might be called a positive symbolic function. If
however, it expresses controversial values and identities or ineffec-
tively communicates certain standards, this law is a form of negative
symbolic legislation (which in most sociological literature so far
has simply been characterised as symbolic legislation as such).15
Analysing legislation with both functions in mind therefore need
not prejudge evaluation but, as I will argue below, it may be a useful
instrument in such an evaluation.
IV. THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF LAW
A statute may express certain shared values which are connected
with the identity of a political community. This is not typical of
statutes. There are many other symbols that can have such an
14 If both functions are predominant and the protective and instrumental func-
tions are weak or absent, we could speak of symbolic legislation. However, I
prefer to speak of symbolic function rather than of symbolic legislation, because
the latter expression suggests that this is a distinct type of legislation.
15 Though my analysis of symbolic functions of legislation in various ways
resembles that of B. van Klink (1998), De wet als symbool. Over wettelijke
communicatie en de Wet gelijke behandeling van mannen en vrouwen bij de arbeid
(diss. Tilburg University), Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink (and has been inspired
by his work), I prefer a more neutral vocabulary rather than, as Van Klink does,
accept the traditional negative connotation of symbolic legislation.
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expressive function. A text such as the Declaration of Independ-
ence or an institution such as the Dutch House of Orange may
symbolise the independence of a nation and the values assumed
to have been at the basis of the struggle for independence. The
crucifix in schools in Bavaria presents another, more controversial,
example.16 A symbolic role may also be fulfilled by stories such as
those of the Exodus or, in more recent times, those of Rosa Parks,
who with her refusal to yield her bus seat to a white man became a
symbol of the Civil Rights Movement in the USA.
Authoritative texts, such as the Constitution or formal legislation,
are particularly effective symbols in expressing certain values. They
have been laid down by authorities which are supposed to represent
us, the political community. We know that they can be changed if
there is sufficient political will, and their continued existence may
symbolise the fact that the community continues to subscribe to
them. As texts, they are usually carefully formulated and there-
fore express certain ideas and values more clearly than material
symbols or stories would. In addition, they usually have an abstract
and general style, and are therefore more directly connected with
fundamental values than case law.17
Legal texts with a strong expressive function need not be
connected with claims about objectivity or universality. Some texts
may have directly universalistic aspirations, for example when
they aim to express universal rights; the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is a case in point. Most texts acquire their expressive
meaning because they are connected with a particular national iden-
tity and a particular national history. As a result of historic processes
and further interpretation, most of these will gradually become
connected to claims about universal values as well, while other
texts may retain their particularistic outlook. Examples of the latter
may be the constitution of an official religion or state church, or
the official recognition of a national language. Examples of the
former are more common and illustrate clearly that the claim to
16 W. van der Burg and F.W.A. Brom (1999), ‘Die Neutralität des Staates’, in:
K.P. Rippe (ed.), Angewandte Ethik in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft, Freiburg,
CH: Freiburger Universitätsverlag, pp. 53–81.
17 Though in certain jurisdictions, for example the US Federal System, the
broad style and supreme authority of a Supreme Court may give its cases a
similarly general meaning.
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universality may be quite controversial. To many Dutch citizens, the
constitutional ban on the death penalty is a symbol of civilisation: it
expresses that the value of human life is sacred to us. To most US
citizens, the existence of the death penalty is not inhumane at all –
they think it expresses a tough stand on serious crime. The freedom
to carry arms in the US is another example of a constitutional clause
with high expressive meaning: it is a symbol for many Americans
that the US is a free country, while it is not only uncivilised but
even irrational in the eyes of many outsiders. As these examples
show, historical embeddedness and strong emotional meaning make
it very difficult to discuss openly which of these two positions is
more justified.
The concept of values which is central to this expressive func-
tion of law needs some clarification. Values are both subjective and
objective. They are in a sense relational, because they are connected
with the attitude of a person or a community towards itself and
towards something in (social) reality. Freedom and tolerance are
values in the sense that they are both valued and valuable; they
are valued by a national community and, at the same time, they are
valuable as such. The fact that they are held as values by a national
community or by a person and the extent to which they are valued
can be characteristic of that community or person. The expressive
function of law can refer to both: the law can express an identity
and it can express the values connected with that identity.
Perhaps it should be emphasised that this identity can be shared
or controversial and that these values can be common values or
merely those of a majority or even a minority. Whether the values
or identity are controversial or not, the law can be an expression of
them.
The recognition of the expressive function of law is not only
important for descriptive purposes; it is also fruitful for normative
theory: it can be the starting point both for critical analysis and for
constructive suggestions for new legislation. A law should express
the common values held by a political community; in case of dead-
lock in legislative debates, this insight can sometimes show a way
out to find the consensus at a deeper level, that of values. The law
can, however, also fail to express the common values, which can be
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an argument for criticism and for reform. I will illustrate this with
some examples.
Sometimes, attention for the expressive function can show a way
out of political deadlock on moral issues. An example is the debate
on embryo legislation. In my view, this has been structured and
conceptualised inadequately as a debate on the moral status of the
embryo in terms of rights or interests.18 If we reconstruct it as a
debate on the values held by the political community and on how
these values should be interpreted and put into practice, we find a
way which allows us to do more justice to the moral views of many
citizens. Among the common values are those of personal autonomy
and of respect for human life – also in its embryonic form. These
common values should be expressed in legislation and be used as
a common normative framework in its implementation, either by
parliament itself or by self-regulating practice. If there is this funda-
mental agreement at a deeper level than that of concrete rules, we
should start there and formulate the common standards in the law.
To me, as a citizen of the Netherlands, it seems most important that
our law somehow expresses that we are a civilised country which
does not completely ‘instrumentalise’ human embryos. That is an
important part of my own identity, as a member of a civilised nation
which respects the value of human life. However, it is much less
crucial to me what exactly the criteria and conditions will be for
allowing experimentation – for example, whether the embryo should
be no older than eight or fourteen days after conception. The basic
values are more important than the precise rules.
A starting point for critical analysis may be found in the idea that
the law should express common values connected with a common
political identity. Perhaps this idea seems to justify a dubious legal
moralism, but this depends on which normative political theory is
in the background.19 If connected with a sophisticated democratic
theory (e.g. a Dworkinian liberalism), it is no more vulnerable to
the usual objections to legal moralism than any form of protective
or instrumental legislation. If we construe a normative position
about instrumental or protective legislation, a basis for evaluating
its limits and possibilities is the ideal of democracy. This same ideal
18 For this example, cf. Van der Burg (1996).
19 I want to thank Govert den Hartogh for drawing my attention to this problem.
THE EXPRESSIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTIONS OF LAW 45
can be used for normative analyses of the way in which the legis-
lator should deal with the expressive meaning of law in cases of
controversy.
Clearly not all statutes enjoy nation-wide consensus – although
this is the ultimate democratic ideal. In a democracy, this need
not be a serious problem; citizens must accept that the democratic
majority can make decisions they do not like. However, democracy
is more than simply majority rule. It demands also that a majority
respect minorities and treat the members of these minorities with
equal respect and concern. If laws do not express a common identity
and common values, but only the values and identity of part of the
population, this may conflict with this norm of equal respect.
There is a significant variation in the seriousness of democratic
deficiencies in this respect. If the rules of property law are not the
rules I would prefer, I must simply accept my democratic loss. These
rules as such are not characteristic of the common identity of the
country to which I belong, and therefore they do not affect my
self-image and self-respect. If I do not share the values behind my
country’s property law, this is already more problematic, because
these values may be more directly connected with the identity of
the community.20 As collective values are more strongly connected
with identity than mere rules, the risk is greater that I somehow feel
alienated from that political community. The most important defi-
ciency, however, exists if the property laws express certain values
or principles I simply cannot accept without losing my self-respect
as an equal being; then they are seriously flawed from a democratic
point of view. If, for example, married women, Jews or blacks do
not have equal property rights, they are thereby classified as second-
class citizens. This symbolic message of the law may be as harmful
as the actual harms suffered as a result of the discriminatory rules.
Other examples may be the self-definition of a state as Protestant,
Catholic, or Jewish. Such a self-definition of the national identity
cannot be accepted by other religious groups without loss of self-
esteem and should therefore be avoided.21 The Prohibition clause
20 This view on the relation between a political community and its members has
close affinities with Dworkin’s idea of a community of principle. Cf. R. Dworkin
(1986), Law’s Empire, London: Fontana, p. 211.
21 In strongly divided countries, such as Israel, this may be a good reason to be
extremely critical of laws with a strong expressive function, because they express
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in Gusfield’s study presents an example of such a controversial
expression of values and identity which on this ground should be
criticised.
One standard of criticism on laws with a strong expressive func-
tion is therefore that they only express the majority values or the
majority view on the common identity. A much stronger criticism
is warranted if they express values or identities which cannot be
accepted by all citizens without loss of self-respect.
Discriminatory laws provide the best examples of laws which
should be changed for that reason. The Georgia anti-sodomy statute
which was at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick is a case in point.22 This
statute had not been enforced for many years; nevertheless, it was
still in the books and as such had an important symbolic function. It
expresse d that the political community of Georgia considered a gay
lifestyle unacceptable. No gay person could consider himself a full
member of the state of Georgia and at the same time accept the value
judgement that his lifestyle, so strongly connecte d with his personal
identity, was demeaning. Even if the anti-sodomy law had no prac-
tical effect at all, its symbolic meaning was highly discriminatory
and, therefore, this law should have been abolished.
A similar debate is that about equal recognition of same-sex
relationships. In the Netherlands, most legal differences between
same-sex and married couples have been removed during the last
decade. In the foreseeable future, many remaining differences will
disappear as well. For example, under strict conditions, adoption
will be open to same-sex couples. Nevertheless, until the 1998
elections, the former government still did not want to remove the
last barrier to equality and give same-sex couples access to civil
values or identities that cannot be accepted by substantial groups in society. The
official Zionist character of Israel is an example of such an expression that is both
offensive to ultra-orthodox Jews and Palestinians. Cf. A. Harel (1997), Liber-
alism versus Jewish Nationalism: A Case for the Separation of Zionism and State
(paper presented at the Academy Colloquium ‘Nationalism, Multiculturalism and
Liberal Democracy’, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 26–28 November 1997). In
such divided societies, a focus on basic values may lead to divisive strife and,
therefore, the liberal vocabulary of democratic rights should have predominance.
I owe this point to Ruth Gavison.
22 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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marriage (even though a majority of parliament had voted in favour
of this).23
The former government’s argument was that, once officially
registered gay and lesbian couples will have the same rights as
married couples, there will be no discrimination left and that there-
fore there is no point in opening up marriage to them. I think
this is a mistake, because it ignores the expressive function of the
law. In the light of historical and social discrimination, denying
gays and lesbians the highly valued status of marriage can only
be interpreted as a symbol of continuing discrimination. We may
compare this with the criticism on the separate but equal doctrine
on segregated schools: even if the schools were equal, segregation
still expressed that blacks were different and, under those specific
historic circumstances, this implied that blacks had less status. An
analogous criticism should lead to the conclusion that the only
option the state has to end the discrimination of gays and lesbians is
to open up marriage (or to abolish it altogether, but that would be a
different story).24
V. THE COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION OF LAW
Law can be regarded as a form of communication. A statute is an
authoritative text with a normative meaning. Legislation is a form of
communication which needs to be interpreted to serve as a point of
orientation for responsible behaviour by citizens. Law can provide
a normative framework, a set of more abstract values and concepts.
It may express normative standards, communicating to the citizens
that they are expected to be guided by them, but leaving to the
citizens a scope of discretion as to how to interpret and apply the
standards. In this interpretation and implementation process, we
may discern three forms of communication. Though these forms are
usually intertwined, discussing them separately will shed more light
on the communicative function of the law.
23 In the coalition negotiations after the 1998 elections, however, it has been
agreed that in the next period the government will introduce legislation to open
up marriage to same-sex partners.
24 W. van der Burg (1997), ‘Het huwelijk – een omstreden instituut’, NJB 72
(1997) 29, pp. 1321–1325.
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The first form is communication from the legislator to the
citizens.25 A statute is a normative framework which should be
regarded by the citizens as authoritative. It expresses certain norma-
tive standards – values, principles, rules – which citizens should
use as a guide for their behaviour. It may also contain central
concepts, such as the right to self-determination or the care of a
good caregiver, which structure the normative debate in a particular
practice. All these normative standards and concepts need further
interpretation. It is obvious, however, that the necessary extent of
interpretation and discretion differs. More interpretation is needed
and more discretion is given to the citizen if a law formulates vague
standards than if it provides direct and simple rules.
The second form is communication among the citizens them-
selves. A legal text establishes a community of interpretation which
must interpret and implement that text.26 Usually, this interpretation
and communication take place only implicitly, when people directly
‘apply’ the rules of the law, e.g., of traffic law. Rule-following (or
deviant) behaviour can also be regarded as a form of communi-
cation. Sometimes, this interpretation takes place more explicitly,
when people formulate their interpretations and even discuss them
with other citizens. The explicit discussion within the community of
interpretation can be supported by legal and non-legal institutions.
We may think of court proceedings and parliaments, but also of
lively public debates on moral issues.
The third form is communication from citizens to legislature. By
conforming to the rules set by the law or by ignoring them, citizens
may express their opinions about these rules. By interpreting value
standards and by continuously reconstructing these interpretations,
citizens also send a message to the legislature. Again, this may
sometimes be explicitly formulated but most often it is merely a
matter of practice. If the standards are strict rules, the message
of the citizens will usually be a simple one: they accept the rules
or they do not. But if the standards leave a broader scope for
25 For reasons of simplicity and style, I will simply refer to those involved
as citizens. However, the community of interpretation need not only consist of
individual citizens but may also include organisations, companies and officials.
26 This view on communication has been inspired by Witteveen (1991),
pp. 128–129.
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interpretation and for developing new norms, communication may
be more complex. Sometimes the practice’s message will imply that
the law should be changed, in response to changes in the practice
and in the moral and legal views of the citizens.
In a basic sense, legislation always involves the first form of
communication because it uses language as a means. But with
the communicative function of law, I focus on a more specific
phenomenon, connected with the second form. The law may
formulate vague standards, which invite active interpretation
and discussion on those interpretations, both among citizens and
between citizens and the various legal authorities. And the law
may explicitly create institutions that stimulate and organise these
communication processes. The communicative function of law is
connected with both this substantive and this procedural side of
the communication processes. It means that the law may create a
normative framework, a vocabulary and a set of open concepts to
structure normative discussion as well as institutions and procedures
that promote further discussion, in order to let the citizens freely
take their own responsibility as citizens. From this formulation it
will be clear that this communicative function is a gradual one:
it can be stronger and weaker, but it is never completely absent.
Even very rigid rules still have an open texture, and even very
authoritarian legal institutions still allow possibilities of (implicit)
communication.
In legislation on moral issues, the communicative function seems
relatively important. Often, there is no consensus on detailed norms.
What the legislature can hope for, however, is to start a process
of reflection and discussion in which those norms may emerge.27
By formulating a broad normative framework in which at least
the basic values and principles are expressed the law may offer
a point of orientation for this reflection. Rather than prescribing
strict rules which they probably will not follow, the law requests
27 Cf. Brom (1997) and F.W.A. Brom (1998), ‘Developing Public Morality:
Between Practical Agreement and Intersubjective Reflective Equilibrium’, in:
W. van der Burg and T. van Willigenburg (eds.), Reflective Equilibrium,
Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 191–202.
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citizens to participate in this reflection process and take their own
responsibility.
Legislation can deliberately stimulate this continuous process
of interpretation, reflection and discussion. In order to provide
a normative framework that is open to further interpretation and
supports the emergence of new norms, it should focus on expressing
basic values and principles. An inflexible and rigid system of rules
would soon be outdated because of changing social and techno-
logical contexts and because of further developments in social
opinion. Therefore, it need not surprise us that such a focus on
general standards is typical of much legislation on moral issues.
Statutes formulate vague norms such as ‘the care of the good care-
giver’, basic values such as ‘the intrinsic value of animals’, or very
open standards such as the so-called ‘no, unless . . . ’ criterion used
in Dutch legislation.28
A further method to support the ongoing process of reflection
and discussion is to create specific institutions that play a leading
role in such debates. This explains the explosion of ethics commit-
tees in the professions, in research institutions, and in health care.
It is also connected with recent developments in legal theory and
in society towards more reflexive forms such as self-regulation and
autopoiesis,29 and towards more communicative styles of control.30
This process of reflection and discussion may lead to the emer-
gence of new norms, to a consensus on central values and their
meaning or on more concrete principles and rules. They may also
lead to new insights into the way the practice31 should be controlled;
for example, how ethics committees could be made to function more
adequately. This may then lead to new legislation.32 Suggestions
for new legal standards (or for new procedures) may emerge from
28 For example, biotechnological experiments are prohibited, unless an inde-
pendent committee considers them justified.
29 Cf. G. Teubner (1993), Law as an Autopoietic System, Oxford: Blackwell.
30 Cf. M.L.M. Hertogh (1997), Consequenties van controle (diss. Leiden
University), ’s-Gravenhage: VUGA.
31 I use ‘practice’ here in a very broad sense, as referring to every activity in
which legal standards are interpreted and implemented.
32 Although certainly not all moral norms emerging in practice should be codi-
fied in legislation. In my view, the law should take a quite modest view on its
empire.
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the practice and lead to draft legislation. Conversely, draft legisla-
tion can also be a point of orientation for the practice. Suggested
legal standards can cast their shadows and be applied, tested, and
refined (or rejected). This again may lead to changes in those drafts,
whereas at the same time, practice may gradually change in response
to those new standards that do pass the test of practice. Draft legis-
lation may thus, on the one hand, stimulate the process of reflection
and, on the other hand, be the result of this process.
In this perspective, the implementation process is part of a
legislative process. Perhaps it should be put differently: the imple-
mentation and the legislative processes merge into one continuous
interactive process of norm development in which lawmakers and
practice co-operate. Long legislative processes, which are not
uncommon in the case of moral issues, therefore should not always
be deplored.33 If they are an interactive process in which, on the one
hand, the practice changes its norms in the light of draft legislation
and, on the other hand, draft legislation is modified in order to do
justice to the internal morality of the practice, this is only to be
considered positive. This will not only result in better legislation,
but also in more effective implementation.
Embryo legislation provides an illustration of how the commu-
nicative function is to be taken seriously. In my view, such legisla-
tion should not consist of a set of very specific rules. There is not
enough consensus and, moreover, the technological developments
are so rapid and the variety of possible experiments is so diverse
that it is impossible to make a set of concrete rules that adequately
cover the whole range of issues. Legislation should rather express
the central values at stake and, only when it is really possible and
useful, supplement this with some basic guidelines (for example,
that no embryos should be used beyond fourteen days after their
conception). By avoiding too many detailed rules and expressing
only the basic values, the legislator urges experimental and medical
practice to take these values seriously.
A mere request to do so would probably not be very effective;
the scientific, medical and financial interests involved are too great.
33 Cf. J. Vorstenbosch and P. Ippel (1994), ‘De weg naar de wet’, in: W. van der
Burg and P. Ippel (eds.), De Siamese tweeling. Recht en moraal in de biomedische
praktijk, Assen: Van Gorcum, pp. 49–71.
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Therefore, the setting of general standards should be accompanied
by institutionalised procedures in which ethical reflection on those
standards is guaranteed. One way to achieve this is to demand
that all experiments with human embryos should be approved by
an independent ethics committee. All researchers should then be
requested to submit a research protocol in which they clearly explain
why they consider their experiments morally acceptable in light of
the standards expressed in the law. Thus, they are obliged to consider
their own moral responsibility seriously.
The role of such an ethics committee is crucial. If it regards
itself as a semi-judicial institution which authoritatively says ‘yes’
or ‘no’ without much further argument, it would frustrate ethical
reflection and open discussion. Its role should rather be that of a
catalyst in a reflection process. Its style should therefore be highly
communicative, both towards the research and medical practice and
towards the general public. This means that its procedures should
be informal, admitting direct discussion with everyone involved. Its
decisions (which, of course, in the end have to be made) should be
well argued, with explicit discussion of possible counter-arguments.
And these decisions should be made public in such a way that they
invite and stimulate further critical discussion.34
VI. SOME GENERAL REMARKS
So far, I have argued that an adequate understanding of the
expressive and communicative functions of the law offers fruitful
new perspectives for both descriptive and normative analysis. It
shows the rationale for some peculiar characteristics of legisla-
tion on moral issues (some of which, at first sight, seem even
irrational) and provides insight into the various ways such legis-
lation may be of importance to society. It also offers a critical
and constructive perspective on (draft) legislation, because we can
learn how to structure legislation and processes of legislation and
implementation.
34 Brom (1997), pp. 256–264, elaborates on this role of ethics committees.
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Legislation on moral issues often has specific characteristics
which can now be understood better. Some of these have already
been mentioned, but they should be discussed more explicitly.
1. In some cases, the feeling that there should be a law on a
certain subject is very strong, while the ideas about the precise
content of such a law are diverse and vague. This seems irrational:
if one focuses on the protective and instrumental functions, the
reasons for wanting a law usually largely involve the content of that
law. However, the expressive function of law is central here. It is
important for our identity as a civilised nation that we do not treat
human life, even in its embryonic form, as mere tissue and that this
is expressed in our legislation and respected by those doing research.
How this basic value should be elaborated is, however, less central
to our self-understanding. In other words: that there is a law may be
much more important than what the law is.
A similar idea may also be central to other issues, such as aid
to the Third World or to the unemployed. To a civilised country,
it is essential for its self-understanding that it supports those who
cannot support themselves. The extent of this aid, however, is a
secondary, more technical issue (even if it is very important to those
concerned).
2. Vague standards are often criticised by lawyers because of their
lack of content and guidance.35 Yet, they are abundant in legislation
on moral issues, and rightly so. They express the common values
and provide a common normative framework. These basic values
should not only guide us in interpreting other, more concrete
clauses in the law, but especially in reflecting on how to act in
those situations where the concrete rules do not give guidance.
Professional practice (which gives rise to many moral issues) must
be sensitive to variations in context and to differences between
individual persons, and, therefore, can never be fully captured in
rules of conduct.36 For other moral issues, a similar impossibility
35 Cf. J.M. Barendrecht (1992), Recht als model van rechtvaardigheid.
Beschouwingen over vage en scherpe normen, over binding aan het recht en over
rechtsvorming (diss. Tilburg University) Deventer: Kluwer.
36 We have elaborated this idea for the medical professional practice in W.
van der Burg, P. Ippel et al. (1994), ‘The Care of a Good Caregiver: Legal and
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to construct a set of clear rules exists, for example, because of rapid
technological and social developments. Laws containing vague
and open norms provide a common point of reference by which
the norm addressees can be guided without presenting too much
detailed and overly restrictive rules. This function is one of the
reasons why codification of such values and principles should be
welcomed.
3. One of these vague standards in Dutch law is the so-called ‘no,
unless . . . ’ clause. Either explicitly or implicitly, it is a frequent
norm in legislation on moral issues, such as animal experiments
or biotechnology. Animal rights activists have often criticised
these standards as a sham which presents no obstacle for animal
experiments or biotechnology whatsoever. This criticism fails
to notice the expressive and communicative functions of such
standards. They express very effectively that we regard each form
of instrumental use of animals as an evil which requires explicit
justification. And they demand that researchers they take this basic
idea seriously, and present convincing arguments that justify the
proposed experiment. The burden of proof is thus placed where it
belongs, with the researcher. Therefore, ‘no, unless . . . ’ standards
can be fully justifiable.37
4. Many statutes on moral issues do not regulate in detail but give
discretionary freedom to the citizens. This is not to be deplored;
it fits well into a communicative approach. If someone looks at
those statutes with the idea that a law should directly protect certain
values, they seem deficient because they give too much license.
However, if one takes into account the idea of an interactive process,
they are not deficient at all. They simply leave the primary responsi-
bility where it should be: with the citizens. They are better situated
to see what, in their specific situation and context, is the best thing to
do to realise certain values. This form of self-regulation can be more
efficient in realising those values and, moreover, it does more justice
to the democratic ideal of respect for individual moral autonomy.
Ethical Reflections on the Good Health Care Professional’, Cambridge Quarterly
of Health Care Ethics 3, pp. 38–48.
37 Cf. Brom (1997).
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5. In ordinary law, control is usually carried out by the judicial
system or by administrative agencies; in legislation on moral issues,
we often encounter institutions such as an ethics committee or a
review board. The latter may seem to be a different name for similar
institutions, but they need not be. Most of the committees and boards
have a different role than that of a judge or an administrative agency,
and rightly so. Their primary function is to decide – or rather advise,
a significant difference38 – in individual cases, indeed, but they
do this in connection with other roles. Their role is also to stim-
ulate moral reflection and discussion, in close interaction with the
practice. Their strategy to implement the law is to discuss and to
convince rather than to enforce.
This institution of ethics committees with a communicative style
is a necessary complement to the fact that citizens are urged to
take their own responsibility in interpreting the law. If there is not
much room for interpretation, control can be much more direct
and repressive. However, if there is more room for interpretation,
repressive control is not very effective because there will be too
much discussion on whether a certain interpretation is acceptable or
not. An ethics committee in continuous discussion with the practice
is thus a more effective way of implementing communicative laws
than a judge with a repressive style of law enforcement.
6. Symbolic legislation requires a different attitude, both of citizens
in general and of lawyers and legal scholars. Citizens should take
a non-strategic attitude towards the law. They should not regard
the legal rules as external side-constraints, as they might do with
instrumental or protective rules that merely must be observed (or
not, if the citizens are prepared to pay the penalty in case they are
caught). They should regard symbolic legislation as an invitation to
take their own responsibility in realising the values at issue. In other
words, they are invited to internalise the values behind the law.
Lawyers and legal scholars should take a non-legalistic and non-
doctrinal attitude. They should avoid treating vague, open standards
as if they were some form of rules manqués. They should resist the
38 Most ethics committees do not decide themselves but give advice to those
who have to make the formal decision of giving permission, for example, the
board of the research institute or the Minister.
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temptation (which may seem second nature to many lawyers) to try
to build a complete and consistent legal doctrine on the basis of these
standards. If they were to do this, the law would become a rigid
and inflexible system of rules again, which would soon be outdated.
Only if they avoid this legalistic attitude, the law can remain open
and responsive towards a rapidly changing society.
VII. IS THIS APPROACH NAIVE ABOUT CONSENSUS?
One possible objection should be addressed here. Does the commu-
nicative perspective suppose that discussions on fundamental values
will always lead to consensus? Is it not more likely that such a prin-
cipled discussion will often lead to an insurmountable dissensus and
even to divisive civil strife? Perhaps we should be more pragmatic
and focus on concrete decisions and rules for which consensus can
be reached more easily.39
Of course, it would be naive to assume that discussion always
leads to consensus. Nevertheless, I think that continuous discus-
sion is at least more likely to lead to consensus. Through open
communication, people will learn from each other, understand how
others perceive a problem, and will more easily find ways to accom-
modate competing claims. Discussion may also lead to a better
understanding of the facts of a problem because mistakes can be
critically exposed. At least some of the factors that block consensus
will thus be removed.
Moreover, a discussion which focuses, on the one hand, on funda-
mental values as expressed or to be expressed in the law and, on the
other hand, on what to do in concrete situations has a better chance
to lead to consensus than a discussion which focuses on the inter-
mediate level of rules. In my experience as a participant in bioethical
discussions, it usually was easiest to establish consensus at the levels
of fundamental values and of concrete decisions. However, as soon
as we tried to construct rules and guidelines, it was much more diffi-
cult to reach agreement. That consensus on concrete problems may
39 I owe this point to Kenneth Winston.
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be more easily reached is perhaps not so surprising.40 My suggestion
that, at the level of basic values, a similar consensus is probable, may
however, raise more suspicion. Is it not precisely at this level that the
fact of pluralism creates real problems? In a sense, it does indeed,
because fundamental outlooks may diverge radically here.41 So, for
some value issues a discussion on or in light of fundamental values
may lead to dissensus – at least in the first stage of discussion.
However, it seems to me that the fact of pluralism has to be
addressed at the levels where people are really involved personally.
That is primarily at the level of very concrete cases (the poor seal
pups beaten to death shown on television, the individual lesbian
couple next door being discriminated at work). But it is also at the
level of fundamental values, because they are connected much more
directly with our common and personal identity and basic outlook
than rules and guidelines. Only if we have a discussion on those
two levels, a more than superficial change in personal outlook and
therefore in personal behaviour is likely to occur.
Apart from these probabilistic arguments, there is a more prin-
cipled reason why this communicative approach is valuable, even
if no consensus is reached. The democratic ideal involves more
than simple majority rule.42 It also implies that decisions ought
to be made on the basis of a discussion on merits, in which all
relevant opinions and perspectives have at least had the chance to
be heard. Moreover, it implies respect for individual autonomy. The
first idea is honoured in the interactive legislative and implemen-
tation processes which I have described above. The second idea is
honoured in the discretion given to individual citizens to decide
40 This has been noted before in the bioethical literature, e.g., in A.R. Jonsen
and S. Toulmin (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry, Berkeley: University of California
Press, p. 18.
41 This fact of pluralism therefore leads Jonsen and Toulmin and other moral
philosophers to a conclusion, quite opposite to mine, that we should avoid appeals
to broader ethical theories and fundamental principles and ideals. Cf. T. van
Willigenburg (1991), Inside the Ethical Expert. Problem Solving in Applied Ethics
(diss. Utrecht University), Kampen: Kok Pharos. I think the recognition of this
pluralism should be the beginning of our analysis but it is certainly not the end.
42 W. van der Burg, (1991), Het democratisch perspectief. Een verkenning van
de normatieve grondslagen der democratie (diss. Utrecht University), Arnhem:
Gouda Quint.
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how to implement the fundamental values of the law. Therefore,
a communicative approach is not only to be defended as a good
legislative strategy but also as a democratic requirement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that law has two often neglected func-
tions: the expressive and the communicative functions. These are
especially important for legislation on moral issues. Of course, a
focus on these functions of the law is not always fruitful; it certainly
should not be regarded as replacing the two traditional functions
of protection and instrumentality – it is only meant as a supple-
mentary approach. Only rarely are the expressive or communicative
functions the most important ones. However, even if they are only
secondary functions, they should still be taken into account.
Equal-rights legislation presents an example of legislation where
the protective and symbolic functions combine. On the one hand,
women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians cannot be expected to
wait patiently until the last person in a society has become convinced
of their equal standing. On the other hand, an attempt to enforce their
rights by sanctions may not be very effective. Prejudices are strongly
rooted in a person’s identity and fundamental moral outlook. The
mere use of sanctions will usually not help very much in changing
these prejudices – the chances are that they will even be reinforced
and entrenched. Prejudices also have to be addressed in a more open
sphere of discussion in the hope that they will be revised in the light
of convincing counter-arguments. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the implementation of equal-rights legislation is often not the task
of the judiciary (at least not primarily), but that of committees, such
as the Dutch Equal Employment Opportunities Committee, which,
both in its procedures and its judgements, has a more communicative
style.43
I do not claim that the expressive and symbolic functions of the
law are dominant. My claim is a more modest one: they should be
taken seriously. I have shown that they are especially important with
respect to issues with a strong moral dimension. This implies that
43 On this Committee, see Van Klink (1998).
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their importance may be increasing. Throughout the Western world,
a process of individualisation can be found: more and more, citizens
develop autonomously their own moral opinions. Moral authorities
such as the churches and public authorities such as the law tend
to have less automatic authority than they used to have. This need
not only apply to statutes with an explicit moral dimension. The
tendency towards stronger individual autonomy may have practical
implications for compliance with every law. Civil obedience can no
longer be taken for granted. In the words of Nonet and Selznick:
we need legitimacy in depth.44 Understanding the expressive and
communicative functions of the law may help the legislative author-
ities in their continuing quest for this democratic legitimation of the
law.






44 Ph. Nonet and Ph. Selznick (1978), Law and Society in Transition: Toward
Responsive Law, New York: Harper & Row.

